



14 SEP 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:

[Redacted]

Director of Security

25X1

SUBJECT:

Draft Inspection Report on the Way CIA Handles  
Its Difficult Personnel [Redacted]

25X1

We have reviewed the draft inspection report on Difficult Personnel Handling Cases (DPHC). We have found the report to be a well-balanced review of the changes made in DPHC handling post-Howard. We are in agreement with most of the recommendations and principal conclusions, although we do have some specific comments on recommendations 4 and 5 as well as on certain issues addressed in the body of the report. These comments are delineated in the attachments. [Redacted]

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Attachments

- A. Comments on the Recommendations
- B. Comments on the Body of the Report



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OS 87 1314

S E C R E T

**SUBJECT: Draft Inspection Report on the Way CIA Handles Its  
Difficult Personnel**

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**OS/C/CI&SG**  (14 Sep 87)

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S E C R E T

COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No. 4: We recommend that the SAS be designated as the focal point for all adverse separations, to include those stemming from unacceptable performance. Any Agency component or career service seeking to separate an employee through the enforced resignation method should be required to notify SAS of its intentions and refer the employee to SAS for further processing. Instructions for doing this should be promulgated in a Headquarters Notice.

Comment: Implies that Agency managers are not capable of terminating ineffective or unsuitable employees without the assistance of SAS. This is debatable and seems to be an example of the IG team falling victim to the Howard syndrome. To us, Recommendation 4 seems to contain a degree of overkill.

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S E C R E T

COMMENTS ON THE BODY OF THE REPORT

Pages 4, 14, 15, and 16: The inspection team feels strongly that the question of alcohol abuse should be addressed during applicant-type polygraph processing. We feel questions on alcohol abuse are not susceptible to resolution by way of polygraph testing. We note that information on alcohol abuse is developed during background investigations. This information is shared with OMS either directly or via the Applicant Review Panel.

Page 4: The report refers to the trial-period program as "little more than an exercise to conduct credit checks, FBI file checks and another polygraph interview." The point the report is making is that the components are not devoting enough attention to the issue of whether the trial-period employee is suitable for retention as a career employee. Nevertheless, we feel the phrasing of this sentence is unfortunate in that it denigrates the significance of security trial-period processing. In addition to a credit check and FBI check, we do police checks in all cases and, of course, the polygraph interview regularly provides significant information. In addition, it is notable that for one reason or another we schedule background investigations in approximately 10 percent of our trial-period cases.

Page 21: The team laments the fact that CI Staff is coordinating on a MOU with the FBI regarding procedures for notifying the Bureau of CIA employees suspected of involvement in espionage. Since this issue has been corrected, we believe these comments can be deleted from the report.

S E C R E T